No single country or organization which respect itself would get involved in this parody of investigation. A real insult to the intelligence exposing the real mafia nature of the UN.
United Nations S/2012/766
Security Council Distr.: General
15 October 2012
Original: English
12-54942 (E) 161012
*1254942*
Letter dated 15 October 2012 from the Chair of the Security Council
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004)
concerning Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the President of the
Security Council
On behalf of the Security Council Committee established pursuant to resolution
1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire, and in accordance with paragraph 16 of
Security Council resolution 2045 (2012), I have the honour to transmit herewith the
midterm report of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire (see annex).
I would appreciate it if the present letter and the attached report were brought
to the attention of the members of the Council and issued as a document of the
Council.
(Signed) Gert Rosenthal
Chair
Security Council Committee established pursuant to
resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire
S/2012/766
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Letter dated 14 September 2012 from the Group of Experts on
Côte d’Ivoire addressed to the Chair of the Security Council
Committee established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004)
The members of the Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire have the honour to
submit herewith the midterm report of the Group, prepared in accordance with
paragraph 16 of Security Council resolution 2045 (2012).
(Signed) Raymond Debelle
(Signed) Eugene Fatakanwa
(Signed) Simon Gilbert
(Signed) Joel Salek
(Signed) Manuel Vazquez-Boidard
S/2012/766
12-54942 3
I. Introduction
1. In a letter addressed to the President of the Security Council dated 22 June
2012 (S/2012/479), the Secretary-General announced his appointment of five
members of the Group of Experts as follows: Raymond Debelle (Belgium, arms
expert), Eugene Rutabingwa Fatakanwa (Rwanda, customs/transport expert), Simon
Gilbert (United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, diamond expert),
Joel Salek (Colombia, finance expert) and Manuel Vazquez-Boidard (Spain, regional
expert). In the same letter, the Secretary-General also designated Mr. Vazquez-
Boidard to serve as the Coordinator of the Group.
2. The Group of Experts commenced its work in the field on 5 July 2012. During
the reporting period, the Group’s activities included meetings with Member States,
international and regional organizations and Government authorities in Côte
d’Ivoire, with a view to obtaining information relevant to the Group’s investigations.
The Group visited Belgium, France, Ghana, Niger, Togo and the Netherlands, in
addition to conducting field visits throughout Côte d’Ivoire. A list of the meetings
and consultations held by the Group is provided in annex 1 to the present report.
3. Since the end of the 2011 post-electoral crisis, the sequence of attacks against
the Ivorian security forces has increased both in terms of frequency and scope, thus
undermining the new administration’s efforts for national reconciliation and the
stabilization of the country.
4. In the Group’s view, the evolving security situation in a number of
neighbouring States is heightening the regional dimensions of the crisis in Côte
d’Ivoire. The progressive deterioration of the political and security situation in
neighbouring Mali, the ongoing mercenary/militia crisis at the Ivorian border with
Liberia and in the western and southern part of Côte d’Ivoire and the presence of
supporters of former president Gbagbo in Ghana who persistently organize the
destabilization of Côte d’Ivoire give cause for concern that numerous armed actors
are actively interested in acquiring weapons and related materiel to violate the
sanctions regime. The Group has already been informed of frequent movement of
weapons and related materiel at the border between Côte d’Ivoire and Mali.
5. The Group is also concerned as the destabilization attempts could benefit from
the high levels of dissatisfaction among individuals who participated in military
actions during the 2011 post-electoral crisis in support of President Ouattara (the
Dozos, the Volontaire and the Démobilisés, among others). Many of these former
combatants feel far from having been compensated for their participation in the
2011 post-electoral crisis military operations.
6. As the security situation continues to deteriorate, the Group remains extremely
concerned by the ongoing circulation of large numbers of weapons in Côte d’Ivoire,
and underlines the importance of Côte d’Ivoire engaging in effective disarmament,
demobilization and reintegration programmes and security sector reform
programmes without further delay. In this regard, the Group welcomes the recent
establishment of the National Security Council in Côte d’Ivoire, the entity that has
been tasked to move security sector reform efforts forward in Côte d’Ivoire, under
the leadership of the Presidency.
7. As the security situation in western Côte d’Ivoire remains an important
challenge for the Ivorian authorities and their international partners, the Group notes
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that the lack of effective control by State officials over Ivorian territory continues to
be a threat to the effective implementation of the sanctions regime.
II. Investigation methodology
8. During the first half of its mandate, the Group conducted field-based
investigations throughout Côte d’Ivoire and neighbouring States. The Group also
reviewed documentary evidence provided by local, regional, national and
international organizations and private companies.
9. During each of its investigations, the Group sought incontrovertible
documentary evidence to support its findings, including physical evidence such as
markings applied to arms and ammunition. When such specific evidence was not
available, the Group required at least two independent and credible sources to
substantiate a finding.
10. The Group conducted investigations in each of its mandated fields to evaluate
potential violations of relevant Security Council sanctions. The Group’s findings
with respect to States, individuals and companies were, to the extent possible,
brought to the attention of those concerned to give them an opportunity to respond.
11. The Group also deems it important to highlight that to date in the mandate
budget cuts have severely restricted its capacity to maintain a constant presence in
the field and to visit Member States in pursuit of its investigations. The Group is
concerned that reductions to its budget may further limit its investigations during
the second part of its mandate pursuant to resolution 2045 (2012), undermining its
ability to submit a comprehensive final report to the Security Council Committee
established pursuant to resolution 1572 (2004) concerning Côte d’Ivoire.
III. Compliance with the Group’s requests for information
12. During the first half of its mandate, the Group addressed official
communications to Member States, international organizations and private entities
and individuals. The Group believes it is important to highlight, at this stage, the
requests that have remained unanswered even though they were transmitted at the
beginning of 2012 (during the Group’s previous mandate).
13. Parties that replied satisfactorily to the Group’s communications responded to
all of the Group’s questions promptly in such a way as to facilitate specific
investigations. The Group received satisfactory responses from Canadian Natural
Resources Limited, Randgold Resources Limited, Société générale de banques en
Côte d’Ivoire, Banque atlantique Côte d’Ivoire, the Ministry of Agriculture, the
Ministry of Defence, Société ivoirienne de banque (SIB), Banque internationale
pour le commerce et l’industrie de la Côte d’Ivoire (BICICI), Arab Banking
Corporation, Tunisia, Banque de l’habitat de Côte d’Ivoire (B.H.C.I.), Banque
nationale d’investissement (BNI), Côte d’Ivoire, Tullow Oil (PLC), Kenya Airways
and Air Kazakhstan airlines.
14. In some cases, parties did not respond to the Group’s requests for information,
despite a number of requests and reminders. The Group did not receive responses
from the following entities and individuals: the Ministry of Economy and Finance of
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Côte d’Ivoire; Moussa Dosso (current Minister of Industry of Côte d’Ivoire); the
Chamber of Commerce and Industry of Côte d’Ivoire; Banque centrale des etats de
l’Afrique de l’ouest, in Côte d’Ivoire; Editions et Librairies L’Harmattan; JP
Morgan Chase Bank; Rixtel Ltd.; Ecobank; Banque Martin Maurel, France; Banque
Martin Maurel, Monaco; BNP Paribas Fortis, Belgium; Centre d´éditions ivoirien de
publications administratives “C.E.I.P.A., SARLE”; HSBC Hong Kong; and Société
générale, France.
IV. Cooperation with stakeholders
A. Cooperation with the Panel of Experts on Liberia
15. In pursuance of paragraph 11 of Security Council resolution 2045 (2012), the
Group maintained a strong working relationship with the Panel of Experts on
Liberia, especially in terms of conducting joint investigations and exchanging
information on a regular basis.
B. Cooperation with Ivorian authorities
Government of Côte d’Ivoire
16. During the first part of the Group’s mandate period, the Government of Côte
d’Ivoire maintained a good level of cooperation with the Group; however, the Group
is concerned about the lack of cooperation from the Ministry of Economy and
Finance.
C. Cooperation with the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire
17. The Group wishes to express appreciation for the valuable support provided by
the United Nations Operation in Côte d’Ivoire (UNOCI) during the first part of its
mandate. The Mission continues to make available offices, transport and
administrative support to successive Groups of Experts. The UNOCI Integrated
Embargo Monitoring Unit provides logistical support to the Group and shares
important information related to the embargo, in particular data concerning
ammunition and material that entered Côte d’Ivoire in violation of the sanctions
regime (see paras. 24 and 25 below). The administrative support provided by the
Unit also continues to be excellent.
V. Arms
A. Lack of notification of non-lethal equipment: radio equipment
and uniforms
18. In paragraph 4 of resolution 2045 (2012), the Security Council introduced a
notification procedure for the import of non-lethal equipment by the Ivorian
authorities. Nonetheless, the Group observed that the following equipment entered
Côte d’Ivoire without having been duly notified to the Committee by the
Government of Côte d’Ivoire; these imports thereby constitute violations of the
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sanctions regime. The Group observed in July 2012 that the Ivorian Ministry of
Defence ordered from the French company Soicex Electronique VHF and HF radio
equipment manufactured by Motorola, Danimex and Barrett, as well as Thuraya
satellite phone equipment. The Group is of the view that Soicex Electronique
repeatedly violated the sanctions regime on Côte d’Ivoire, as reported during its
previous mandate (see S/2012/196). In June 2012, the Group was informed that
Soicex Electronique intended to export this material in the framework of the
notification procedure set in resolution 2045 (2012). However, at the time of writing
this report, the notification procedure had not been engaged vis-à-vis the Committee
and the material was in fact delivered by the company to Côte d’Ivoire in June 2012
(see annex 2).
19. During the first half of its mandate, the Group observed that the Forces
republicaines de Côte d’Ivoire (FRCI), the gendarmerie and the police wore new
uniforms. The Group is in possession of documents showing that Dutex SARL
(located in Tunisia) and Groupe Marck (located in France) provided the Ivorian
security forces with uniforms and military clothing without having notified the
Committee (see annex 3).
20. On 1 August 2012, the UNOCI Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit
documented 3,000 items of military clothing (1,000 shirts, 1,000 pairs of trousers,
and 1,000 vests in desert operation colours) in the customs warehouse for imported
goods at Abidjan Airport. According to airway bills accompanying the two
shipments, the military clothing was exported from Tunisia by Dutex SARL (based
in Tunisia). The clothing also bore the logo of USMC Company (located in France).
The declared end user is M. Daniel Ouattara, former Chief of the National
Programme for Reintegration and Community Rehabilitation.
21. Between November 2011 and January 2012, SOFEXI (Groupe Marck)
provided a significant number of combat uniforms, additional military clothing and
tactical equipment (see annex), for a value of more than 6 million euros, to the
Ivorian security forces without following the exemption procedure nor the
notification procedure to the Committee.
22. According to the information provided to the Group by the Ivorian Transit
interarmées,1 Groupe Marck provided the Ivorian security forces with similar materiel
from 2004 to 2010, thus breaching the sanctions regime. In 2009, the Group noted
that the Forces nouvelles were equipped with uniforms manufactured by Groupe
Marck (see S/2009/521); the manufacturer informed the Group that the uniforms
(twill F1 “lizard” camouflage) had been supplied to the Ministries of Defence of
Burkina Faso and Benin. This is another potential case of transfer of materiel under
embargo from Burkina Faso to Côte d’Ivoire.
B. Lack of exemption request for lethal equipment: combat knives
23. In August 2012, the UNOCI Integrated Embargo Monitoring Unit informed the
Group about the presence in Abidjan International Airport of several boxes containing
combat knives manufactured by the Austrian company GLOCK Ges.m.b.H. (see
__________________
1 The Transit interarmées is the customs agency of the Ministry of Defence and the Ministry of
the Interior, and as such, automatically registers all imports of weapons, ammunition,
equipment, vehicles and supplies for the armed and security forces.
S/2012/766
12-54942 7
annex 5). The invoice for that transaction (dated 16 April 2012) shows that USMC
(located in France) sold the combat knives to the Ivorian National Commission on
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration, even though the Commission
ceased to exist in 2007.2 The Group notes that there was no notification on this
particular equipment having been transmitted to the Committee by the Ivorian
authorities. The Group intends to present in its final report further evidence related
to the role of the National Programme for Reintegration and Community
Rehabilitation and the National Commission on Disarmament, Demobilization and
Reintegration in acquisitions of sanctioned goods.
C. Ammunition sold to Burkina Faso identified in Côte d’Ivoire
24. During its previous mandate (April 2011-April 2012), the Group repeatedly
observed the presence in Côte d’Ivoire of 7.62 x 39 mm calibre ammunition
manufactured in Romania.
25. On 22 March 2012, the Romanian authorities informed the Group that the
aforementioned ammunition had been delivered to the Government of Burkina Faso
on 16 December 2005 and 21 June 2006 (see annex 6a). On 23 April 2012, in a
second reply, Romanian authorities informed the Group that the aforementioned
ammunition was delivered to Burkina Faso on 18 June 2008 (see annex 6b). Both
these sales were performed with end user certificate and exemption certificates from
the Economic Community of West African States (ECOWAS).
26. The Group is seriously concerned by the recurring discoveries in Côte d’Ivoire
of weapons and related materiel initially sold to Burkina Faso, as highlighted in past
reports of the Group of Experts (see S/2009/521, paras. 145-151).
D. Aviation
27. The Group continues its investigations concerning flights that are suspected to
have participated in the violation of the sanctions regime prior to and during the
2011 post-electoral crisis, and intends to provide the results of these investigations
in its final report, together with an updated review of air fleet capacity and the
airports and airstrips of Côte d’Ivoire.
E. Embargo violations related to military attacks in Côte d’Ivoire:
recruitment of mercenaries and violations of the arms embargo
Efforts of exiled members of former President Gbagbo’s regime to destabilize
Côte d’Ivoire
28. As noted in the Group’s prior reports, important dignitaries of the former
Gbagbo regime, numerous members of militia such as the Young Patriots and trained
combatants and commanders from the former Forces de défense et de sécurité,
sought refuge in Benin, Ghana, Liberia and Togo following the post-electoral crisis.
As these groups have been reported to organize and finance, with the recruitment of
mercenaries and the purchase of arms and related materiel, military operations that
__________________
2 The name of Daniel Ouattara appears again in the documents as Chief of the Commission.
S/2012/766
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have taken place in Côte d’Ivoire, the Group is investigating representatives of this
network for their direct and/or indirect contribution to the violations of the Ivorian
sanctions regime.
29. According to the Group’s sources, on 12 July 2012, a meeting took place in
Takorady, Ghana, where various exiled groups supporting the regime of former
President Gbagbo decided to unite their efforts and define a common course of
action, with a view to regaining power in Côte d’Ivoire, including the development
of a regional political and military strategy to identify possible bases of operations
in neighbouring countries such as Mali.
30. Individuals such as Marcel Gossio (former Chief Executive Officer of Abidjan
seaport), Alphonse Mangly (former Customs general director), Pastor Moïse Koré
(former spiritual adviser to President Gbagbo), Justin Koné Katinan (former
Minister of Budget of Côte d’Ivoire), Ms. Nadiana Bamba (second spouse of
Laurent Gbagbo) and Charles Blé Goudé (former Minister of Youth of Côte
d’Ivoire, who has been under United Nations sanctions since 2006) have reportedly
been involved in financing the military and political network that planned and
carried out several important attacks in various parts of Côte d’Ivoire in 2012 (see
annex 7).
31. The Group obtained the membership list of the organization (see annex 8),
which contains the names of the military structure that was put in place. According
to various interlocutors, this network is well organized, has been able to plan and
carry out important operations, and is believed to have entered a process of lessons
learned and reassessment of their political and military objectives.
32. Various interlocutors have also drawn the Group’s attention to the ethnical
dimension of the political tensions at stake in western Côte d’Ivoire. The Group
cannot exclude the possibility that members of that organization are currently trying
to purchase weapons and related materiel, and as such, the Group will continue its
investigations on this matter.
Related activities in Mali
33. At the end of June 2012, a meeting took place in a military camp in Bamako
between representatives of that organization (Lieutenant Diby, alias “Sandokan”,
and Mr. Fofana3) and members of the Malian Junta (Capitaine Sanogo, Colonel
Issouf, Adjudant Chef Soiba Diarra, Adjudant Chef Samba Sangaré and Adjudant
Amara). During the meeting, members of the Malian Junta expressed interest in
supporting destabilization operations that would compromise efforts of ECOWAS
and its current Chairman, Ivorian President Alassane Ouattara, to promote peace and
stability in the subregion.
34. In this context, the Group is also aware that a meeting was held between a
representative of the organization (Diby/Fofana) and a representative of Ançar Dine
(rebel group operating in northern Mali), on the border between Mauritania and
Senegal, in order to discuss possible future cooperation, with a view to threatening
peace and security in the subregion and providing possible military technical
assistance through mercenaries. In this regard, the Group has documented short
__________________
3 Representative of Damana Pickass of the Young Patriots.
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message service exchanges of a member of the pro-Gbagbo organization in which
this particular meeting was mentioned (see annex 9).
35. Owing to the strong likelihood of illegal circulation of arms and materiel in
Côte d’Ivoire, in violation of the sanctions regime, the Group intends to follow up
closely the above-mentioned cases and provide a comprehensive analysis in its final
report.
Recruitment of mercenaries and combatants in Ghana and Liberia
36. During its mandate period in 2011 and 2012 the Group had already identified
and alerted the Committee on the integrated presence and coordinated actions of
Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militias who sought refuge in Liberia.
37. During the first half of its mandate, the Group noted that armed groups
(composed mainly of Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia) have increased the
frequency, the scope and the impact of their attacks since the end of the post-electoral
crisis, under the direct guidance and support (political and financial) of radical
pro-Gbagbo exiled groups. For example, the Group was informed that Didier
Goulia, alias Roger Tikouaï (an Ivorian national, former customs officer), conveyed
funds from Ghana to Liberia on repeated occasions.
38. According to the Group’s sources, military actions that have been conducted
since early 2012 in Côte d’Ivoire were planned in Ghanaian territory, funds were
transferred from Ghana to Liberia (physically or via bank transfers) and recruitment
took place in Liberia.
39. The territory of eastern Liberia has been identified as a recruitment platform
and rear base (with several camps for military training) for these military groups.
During its investigations on arms and related materiel, the Group also gathered
sufficient information in order to identify the structures that recruited mercenaries
and combatants for operations conducted in Côte d’Ivoire, and consequently
transmitted this information to the Panel of Experts on Liberia and UNOCI.
40. In its investigations of the weapons and related materiel introduced into Côte
d’Ivoire by Liberian mercenaries and Ivorian militia that carried out the attack near
the locality of Para on 8 June 2012 (in which 7 UNOCI peacekeepers from the Niger
were killed), the Group was able to identify the individuals that led the operation:
Niehzee Barway, alias Joseph Dweh (a Liberian national from Ziatown) and Stephen
Gloto (a Liberian national, also known as Blé Guirai, alias “Rambo”, former
member of the Lima special forces in Liberia). The Group immediately shared this
information with UNOCI, the Ivorian authorities and the Panel of Experts on
Liberia. The Group also determined that the person who planned the operation, Tee-
Mark (reportedly an Ivorian national and former member of Mouvement populaire
ivoirien du Grand Ouest (MPIGO)), receives regular funding from Adama Pickass,
an Ivorian Young Patriot leader now exiled in Ghana.
41. The Group was informed that several individuals among this armed group
carried Thuraya satellite phones. The presence of this sophisticated and expensive
equipment demonstrates that the combatants received important funding in the
conduct of a well-planned operation.
42. The Group understands that several Ivorian and Liberian field commanders,
known as “Generals”, are actually mobilizing elements and training recruits and
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have been involved in current military operations. Among these commanders, the
Group already identified Isaac Chegbo (alias Bob Marley), Oulai Tako Anderson
(alias Tarzan de l’Ouest, Gouhian Mompoho Julien (alias Colombo), Augustin
Vlayee (alias Bushdog), Jefferson Gbarjolo (alias Iron Jacket), Bobby Sarpee and
Moses Juru.
Training activities of combatants
43. The Group is deeply concerned by the existence of training camps in Liberia,
where mercenaries and Ivorian militia evade legal authorities and receive illegal
military training. The Group cannot exclude the possibility that these training camps
also serve as a staging point for the distribution of weapons and related materiel.
The Group is also investigating the presence of foreign military personnel in
training camps in Côte d’Ivoire (located in Tai forest and in the San Pedro-Dabou
area).
44. On 13 August 2012, Péhé Kanhouébli (a border post located in Côte d’Ivoire)
was reportedly attacked by an armed group composed mainly of Liberians
(estimated 60 per cent), Ivoirians (25 per cent), combatants from Sierra Leone
(10 per cent) and Guineans (5 per cent). These combatants reportedly received
periodic military training in Pékan camp (located in Liberia) during the six months
preceding the attack.
45. The Group understands that some of the weapons used during the attack on
Péhé Kanhouébli were transported from Monrovia to Pékan training camp a few
days before the attack, which was said to have been led by Paul Kango (an Ivorian
national, former MPIGO and Mouvement patriotique de Côte d’Ivoire (MPCI)
combatant). This attack was reportedly planned in Monrovia by the same individuals
who planned the attack between Para and Sao. This information was shared with the
Panel of Experts on Liberia in a timely manner.
VI. Finance
46. In the framework of its mandate, the Group analyses “the sources of financing,
including from the exploitation of natural resources in Côte d’Ivoire, for purchases of
arms and related materiel and activities”, as set forth in paragraph 7 (b) of resolution
1727 (2006).
47. In the sector of finance, the Group therefore focused its investigations on five
main areas. First, to date in its mandate, the Group has observed a consistent loss of
Government revenues owing to the increased and unprecedented smuggling of cocoa
and cashew nuts through the eastern border of Côte d’Ivoire (with Ghana). The
Group cannot rule out the prospect that a portion of those revenues was used for the
purchase of arms. Second, the Group continues to investigate finance cases related
to the oil industry, gold mining and timber exploitation that could potentially yield
significant revenues for the purchase of weapons. Third, the Group is also following
up outstanding responses to its letters related to financial investigations that started
immediately after the Group submitted its final report in mid-March 2012
(S/2012/196).
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48. The Group also continued to follow up cases of the parallel illegal taxation
system previously reported by the Group (see S/2012/196, para. 17) and highlighted
by the Security Council in paragraph 22 of its resolution 2045 (2012).
49. Finally, the Group is investigating the financial resources of the network
organized against the Government of Côte d’Ivoire, as set out in the arms section of
this report. The network’s plan also includes collecting funds from outside the
country.
50. Owing to the complexity of the subjects described above, the Group intends to
continue its investigations during the second part of its mandate, with a view to
providing a more accurate and comprehensive analysis in its final report, due in
mid-April 2013.
A. Cocoa and cashew nuts smuggling
51. The Group is investigating an unprecedented pattern of cocoa and cashew nuts
smuggling directed through the eastern border of the country into Ghana. The Group
believes that part of those revenues may be used for the purchase of arms in
violation of the sanctions regime. In a meeting with the Group on 18 July 2012, the
Ivorian Minister of Agriculture acknowledged that the loss of revenues generated by
the illicit trafficking of these two commodities is so large that it poses an economic
threat to the State’s income. The Government of Côte d’Ivoire has created an
interministerial committee in order to address this issue more effectively.
52. In this specific case, owing to the wide scale of the illegal operations, the type
of smuggling is more sophisticated than the traditional contraband of commodities
that occurs along porous borders, and depends on market price variations.
53. The Group believes that it is important to assess the proportion of possible
revenue loss in order to establish whether any funds derived from the sale of this
contraband have been diverted in order to purchase arms and materiel in violation of
the embargo regime and, moreover, whether these illicit funds have assisted
pro-Gbagbo elements in their attempts to destabilize the current Ivorian Government,
as described in the arms section of this report (see reference paragraphs). In order to
carry out this large-scale smuggling operation, it appears that an organized illegal
business structure has been established on both sides of the Côte d’Ivoire-Ghana
border.
54. This structure includes the involvement of a company, a number of
intermediaries (“traitants”) and some elements within the relevant government law
enforcement agencies and security forces. The Group is still investigating this
illegal network in order to provide a more complete and detailed description in the
final report.
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B. Oil industry and unabated exploitation of natural resources (gold
and timber)
Oil
55. It is important to highlight that, as previously indicated by the Group (see
S/2012/196, paras. 94-95), revenues obtained from the oil industry were made
available in exchange for arms and related materiel.
56. During the current mandate, the Group analysed documents obtained
concerning the audit performed by the Government administration on the Stateowned
oil company Société nationale d’opérations pétrolières de la Côte d’Ivoire
(PETROCI). The Group believes that the audit’s findings serve to illustrate the
potential threat of funds being diverted from the oil industry for the purchase of
arms and related materiel. Some of the main findings are summarized in the
paragraphs below.
57. The external services of PETROCI increased by 35 per cent, from $23.9 million
in 2008 to $32.3 million in 2010. That increase was due to an overwhelming
payment of fees and commissions.
58. During the same period, the cost of personnel increased by 16 per cent, from
$13 million to $15 million, due to recruitment processes and multiple promotions,
despite the fact that the payroll of staff in 2008 was unusually high. Contracts over
$2 million were granted to consultants (former PETROCI workers) for any type of
function. Financial expenses increased by up to 64 per cent due to inexplicable
financial costs from banks and traders.
59. The list of the findings is extensive and includes a variety of areas where
revenues had been lost, mainly in the areas of exploration and production (i.e., under
estimation of the real production capacity) and in contracts with different private oil
companies.
60. The Group notes that poor management of the oil industry increases the risks
of diversion of funds that could be used to purchase weapons and related materiel in
violation of the sanctions regime. In this regard, the Group is currently investigating
cases where funds originating from the oil industry may have been illegally used for
the purchase of arms by means of one of the above-mentioned irregularities.
Gold
61. The Group continues to investigate numerous reports of increasing illegal
artisanal gold mining activity, more specifically near the northern cities of Korhogo,
Ouangolo, Dikidougou, Boundiali, Ferkessedougou and Sinematiali. The Group is
aware that the mining of artisanal gold has been expanding rapidly over the past few
years in tandem with the ever-rising price of gold on the world market. It is also
predicted by market analysis that the price will continue to rise over the next
12 months. This has resulted in significant economic and demographic growth of
some towns in the region, and it is therefore expected that artisanal gold production
in Côte d’Ivoire will continue to rise accordingly. Also of significance is the level of
recovery technology being introduced by workers from neighbouring countries that
was previously unknown in Côte d’Ivoire.
62. Taking the above-mentioned into consideration, as well as the fact that all
artisanal gold mining is currently illegal in Côte d’Ivoire, the Group expects to see
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an increase in the number of illegal buyers and exporters. All of this is also likely to
have the effect of further straining relationships between local communities,
authorities and legal mining operations. The Group expects to see increasing pressure
on the large-scale gold mining companies as trespassing of their mining concessions
by artisanal miners continues unabated. The Group cannot exclude the possibility
that revenues obtained have been and are currently being utilized for the purchase of
arms and related materiel.
Timber
63. The Ivorian Minister of Water and Forests officially informed the Group that
that ministry does not have any reports suggesting that governmental revenues could
have been used for the purchase of arms, ammunition or related materiel from 2004
until 2012.
64. Notwithstanding the Minister’s contention, the Group is aware that the timber
industry has been affected by illegal exploitation and corruption (especially after
2004). Therefore the Group intends to analyse the use and the management of funds
derived from timber in order to exclude the possibility that unaccounted funds could
have been used for the purchase of arms and related materiel in violation of the
sanctions regime.
C. Follow-up on outstanding replies to finance queries and
investigations
65. The Group continued to request information related to 16 letters that were sent
during the previous mandate but remained unanswered. These letters are related to
financial investigations initiated by the Group during the previous mandate, mainly
after the submission of the its final report (S/2012/196). The Group believes that it
is of paramount importance to follow up on these investigations in order to obtain
further details about the financial structures put in place to breach the arms
embargo.
66. The companies or banks that have not yet replied to the Group’s queries can be
found in section III of this report, under “Compliance with the Group’s request for
information”.
D. Follow-up on the illegal parallel taxation system
67. In its preliminary investigations, the Group has been able to determine that
although the Government of Côte d’Ivoire has achieved success in regaining control
of the collection of fiscal revenues in most parts of the country, some areas,
especially in the north, have yet to comply with the authorities.
68. From 27 to 29 August 2012, during its visit to the central city of Bouaké, the
Group observed that all major agencies collecting fiscal revenues (customs, treasury,
taxes, water and forests) had been redeployed and are currently functional.
69. However, during its investigations, the Group observed that there continue to
be swaths of the country where illegal groups, most of them integrated by Forces
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nouvelles ex-combatants, extort funds from a variety of businesses (fuel, cotton,
cashew nuts), trade and transport in general.
70. To date, the Group believes that the most affected areas are Bouaké and other
cities in the north, including Katiola, Korhogo and Ferkessedougou. The Group is
concerned that these illicitly extorted funds may be used for the purchase of arms
and ammunition as a means to threaten businesses and the population in general.
71. The Group also continues to pursue its investigations about the funds managed
by the reportedly dismantled financial structure “La Centrale” (the central treasury
of the former Forces nouvelles), and its role as a conduit to funnel funds in violation
of the arms embargo.
72. In this connection, the Group continues to await a reply to its letter transmitted
in July 2012 to the former finance manager of “La Centrale” concerning the Group’s
access to the financial accounts of this organization, as recommended in
paragraph 222 of the Group’s 14 April 2012 report (S/2012/196).
E. Fundraising in possible violation of the sanctions regime
73. The Group is investigating the collection of some $10 million aimed at financing
an organized political and military operation against the Government of Côte d’Ivoire,
and in support of former President Gbagbo. Sanctioned individual Charles Blé
Goudé may also be involved in financing such organization from Ghana.
74. Furthermore, the Group is investigating the Steering Committee for the
Actions of the Ivorian Diaspora),4 an organization established in Belgium on 1 May
2011, which may be also raising funds in support of Gbagbo (see annex 10).
75. The Group is aware that in the short term, the Steering Committee aims to carry
out the largest fundraising project among the Ivorian diaspora in Europe under the
operation called “100,000 volunteers for reconstruction”, with a view to collecting
50 euros per person to finance the fight against the current Government (see annex
11). The Committee undertakes to carry out this operation through the financial
representatives of former President Gbagbo.
76. Although the Steering Committee claims to be a movement with a diplomatic
and political strategy, the Group is conducting investigations in order to establish if
portions of the funds that are being collected may have been used — or are being
used — in violation of the sanctions regime imposed on Côte d’Ivoire and of the
sanctions measures imposed against Laurent Gbagbo (i.e., assets freeze).
VII. Customs and transport
77. In accordance with paragraph 22 of resolution 2045 (2012), the Security
Council “calls upon the Ivorian authorities to combat the illegal taxation systems
that remain in place, to take the necessary steps to continue to re-establish and
reinforce relevant institutions and to continue to deploy customs and border control
__________________
4 The Group notes that the Steering Committee has among its objectives to participate in
regaining power in Côte d’Ivoire and re-establishing the legitimate and legal authorities of the
country and democracy.
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officials throughout the country, in the north, west and east of the country, asks the
Group of Experts to assess the effectiveness of these border measures and control in
the region, encourages all neighbouring States to be aware of Ivorian efforts in that
regard and encourages UNOCI, within its mandate, to assist the Ivorian authorities
in the re-establishment of normal customs and border control operation”.
78. On the basis of the above, the Group’s customs investigations have been
initiated to address three main objectives: to assess the redeployment of customs
officers at the Ivorian borders, to assess the training of customs officers and to
evaluate the support provided by UNOCI customs officers; to evaluate the
implementation by Côte d’Ivoire and its neighbouring countries, within national
customs regulations, of all the measures related to the sanctions regime; and finally
to assess and identify possible entry points of arms and related materiel in violation
of the sanctions regime.
A. Customs in Côte d’Ivoire
Redeployment of customs and border control officials throughout the country
and UNOCI customs support
79. The Group conducted investigations in the area of Bouaké and the eastern
border customs posts at Noé, Vonkoro and Soko to assess the effectiveness of the
redeployment of customs officers.
80. Although the Group recognizes the efforts of the Government of Côte d’Ivoire
to re-establish and reinforce customs in Bouaké, it acknowledges that the number of
qualified staff is inadequate owing to the high volume of goods transiting by road
and railways that require technical cargo control and monitoring.
81. In this regard, the local Deputy Head of Customs in Bouaké recognized that at
least 50 customs officers were attending a short-term training at the Customs School
in Abidjan. He was confident that, upon their return, customs control and services
would be improved.
82. During its visits to Noé, Soko and Vonkoro (border with Ghana), the Group
noted that the number of customs officers is insufficient, they lack training and their
equipment and basic infrastructure are inadequate. This situation severely hampers
proper customs controls on imported and exported commodities, therefore impeding
an effective and proper enforcement of the sanctions regime.
Training of customs officials
83. On 30 August 2012, during its visit to the Customs School in Abidjan, the
Group was informed that at least 100 individuals, mainly former Forces nouvelles
combatants, were attending a training session, expecting to be reintegrated into the
national customs agency. The Group welcomed the visit of the Secretary-General of
the World Customs Organization (WCO) in May 2012, whose purpose was to
discuss the way forward for Ivorian customs reforms following the return to peace
in the country.
84. The Group is of the view that since the customs sector is the main institution
responsible for preventing cross-border movement of prohibited and restricted
goods contravening international conventions or laws, cooperation between WCO
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and the Government of Côte d’Ivoire is of paramount importance in terms of
receiving technical support, training and appropriate capacity-building advice.
UNOCI customs support
85. The Group welcomes the appointment by UNOCI of six customs officers with
the purpose of supporting the capacity-building of the customs of Côte d’Ivoire, as
previously recommended by the Group in paragraph 225 of its April 2012 final report
(S/2012/196). However, in this regard, the Group is concerned that although the
customs officers are already working at UNOCI, they are not currently performing
customs duties with a view to identifying potential violations of the embargo, as was
strongly recommended by the Group.
B. Implementation of the sanctions regime
Côte d’Ivoire
86. During its field missions, the Group observed that Ivorian customs and border
protection officers in Bouaké, Noé, Vonkoro and Soko were unaware of the
embargoes on the import of arms and related materiel and the export of rough
diamonds imposed by the Security Council.
87. In fact, customs officers in the above-mentioned areas have never received any
kind of training concerning the implementation of the sanctions regime. The Group
considers this situation as posing a high risk for possible violations of the embargoes
imposed on Côte d’Ivoire. The Group will continue to monitor the situation at all
border posts of Côte d’Ivoire and will provide a more complete and detailed
assessment in its final report.
Neighbouring countries and other Member States
88. The Group assessed the extent to which Member States, particularly
neighbouring countries of Côte d’Ivoire, have implemented within their respective
customs national legislation all measures related to the sanctions regime.
89. While this exercise is ongoing, the Group found that only few Member States
in the subregion have implemented within their respective customs legislations the
decisions of the Security Council concerning the arms and rough diamonds
embargoes, and only one Member State has posted these prohibitions on its customs
website. The Group will continue to assess the extent to which Member States
implement the measures imposed on Côte d’Ivoire and introduce them into their
national customs legislations, and will provide a more complete and detailed
assessment in its final report. The Group will also continue to raise awareness
among Member States on the importance of implementing such measures.
C. Entry points of arms and related materiel in violation of the
sanctions regime
90. On 23 March 2012, Ivorian customs officials authorized the enforcement of
circular 1257, released in 2005, prohibiting the use of roads for the import of goods
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originating from non-ECOWAS countries. This measure resulted in hundreds of
trucks being blocked at various border checkpoints throughout the country.
91. This situation highlights once more the urgent need for additional qualified
customs officers capable of controlling a consistent and large trade in merchandise
and goods imported and exported in Côte d’Ivoire.
92. The Group remains very concerned about the increasing risk of embargo
violations owing to the almost total lack of control by qualified customs officers on
the roads entering the Côte d’Ivoire from the country’s borders with Guinea, Liberia
and Mali. The Group will continue to survey and investigate these routes (in the
northwest of the country) in order to provide a consistent assessment of the risks
and possible violations of the sanctions regime.
93. In this framework, and also considering the deteriorating security situation on
the borders with Liberia, Guinea and Mali, where the presence of armed groups
hampers the conduct of normal customs activities, the Group intends to focus even
more on completing a general evaluation of the functioning of customs in Côte
d’Ivoire in order to highlight its deficiencies. This evaluation will also assist the
Group in understanding and identifying possible solutions to ensure that the Ivorian
customs system operates in conformity with internationally accepted standards and
best practices, as set out in the WCO Revised Kyoto Convention regarding Border
Security Management.5
VIII. Diamonds
94. The measures and the restrictions imposed on Côte d’Ivoire in Security
Council resolution 1643 (2005) and further reiterated in resolution 2045 (2012) still
do not prevent the illicit trafficking of Ivorian rough diamonds.
95. The Group of Experts continues to hold the view that in both Séguéla and
Tortiya, the two main diamond mining areas located in the north of the country,
revenues from the sale of Ivorian rough diamonds continue to have the potential to
be used for the purchase of arms and related materiel, in violation of the sanctions
regime.
A. Diamond production
96. The Group of Experts, with the assistance of UNOCI, conducted aerial
reconnaissance exercises over the mining areas of Séguéla in July and August 2012.
Despite the fact that the wet season is in full swing, observations confirmed that
artisanal diamond mining is clearly proceeding, but with a distinct reduction in the
level of activity. However, the Group expects the number of active artisanal miners
to steadily rise as the transition from wet to dry season begins to take effect around
October/November 2012.
97. Other factors negatively influencing production are the continued impact of
the embargo, which deters financiers from investing in artisanal mining and also
from buying diamonds, as well as the continued fall in the price of rough diamonds
__________________
5 Available from http://www.wcoomd.org/home_
pfrevisedkyotoconv.htm.
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on the global market. The sustained high price of gold continues to have the effect
of diverting the labour force from diamonds to artisanal gold mining.
98. It should also be considered that a major impact on production is the possible
exhaustion of easily mined diamond bearing sites. Both the Diarabana and Bobi
dykes appear to be almost abandoned when compared to previous images from 2008
and 2010. This does not mean these deposits are exhausted of diamonds, but merely
that it has become technically extremely difficult and dangerous for these areas to
be worked in an artisanal fashion. Further intensive exploitation would require the
financing of heavy plant machinery and much more sophisticated management of
materials. To date, such a potential increase in mining costs has not solicited any
interest from investors. Hence, there is the possibility that these areas might now be
labelled “technically” exhausted. This could be confirmed by “professional”
exploration of the sites using mechanized and modern technical methodologies;
however, this would also require a degree of capital investment (see annex 12 —
images of Bobi and Diarabana).
99. Alluvial diamonds, which have eroded over the millennia and now rest in
ancient dry and existing rivers and streams, continue to be targeted, as the
associated diamond-bearing gravels are easily accessible and recovered by miners
using very basic equipment. Diamond recovery rates from such sources are unlikely
to reach the levels achieved from the “diamond-rich” kimberlite dykes. This creates
an interesting challenge for the artisanal mining communities that have specifically
targeted and concentrated their activities on the dykes for a number of years. The
relatively “easy pickings” are possibly over, and these communities must now scour
the countryside for other targets with potentially much lower rates of diamond
recovery. While the Group continually hears from the artisanal communities that the
embargo is to blame for the lack of diamonds and buyers, this may also be the result
of their intensive mining over the past 10 years. These possibilities and issues will
also need to be taken into consideration by the Government when addressing the
future economies of the village communities that have, to some degree, become
reliant on diamond income as an integral part of the local economy during this
period.
100. Taking into consideration the lack of activity in the diamond mining areas and
the corresponding low level of productivity owing to the above-mentioned reasons,
the Group is of the opinion that production levels have fallen considerably over the
past two years. The current estimated value of annual production is in the region of
$10 million to $15 million. Historical statistics and other source documents give the
average price per carat for Côte d’Ivoire diamonds as $100/carat, which therefore
equates to 100,000 to 150,000 carats. There are no reliable current estimates of the
numbers of individuals involved in artisanal diamond mining. However, while the
number of workers has decreased owing to a diversion to the artisanal gold mining
sector and other factors previously discussed, as the diamond reserves and recovery
rates diminish, a greatly increased level of manpower may be required to produce a
similar caratage.
101. The Group intends to continue conducting its aerial and ground reconnaissance
activities in order to monitor the diamond mining areas through the remainder of the
mandate.
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B. Ministry of Mines, Energy and Oil
102. Throughout the first half of the mandate period, there was a demonstrable
disparity between what the Ministry of Mines, Oil and Energy and other State
authorities communicate to stakeholders with regard to the implementation of the
Kimberley Process, versus the reality witnessed on the ground, not only by the
Group but also by other observers, interlocutors and communities.
103. A number of brief documents, Gantt charts and PowerPoint presentations have
been provided to the Group regarding Kimberley Process implementation timelines
and diamond production flow charts; however, the Group has yet to receive any
detailed documentation from the Ministry that describes the actual processes and
procedures needed to ensure implementation of the Kimberley Process. All other
State authorities, including the customs, police, gendarmerie and justice authorities,
are equally oblivious to what is or might be required of them in the future.
104. The Group is of the opinion that there is a palpable lack of political will from
the Government authorities to move forward with the implementation of the
Kimberley Process. State authorities in diamond mining areas are fully aware that
diamond mining, buying, selling and exporting are taking place illegally and, in the
case of clandestine exports, in contravention of the embargo. All of the authorities
with which the Group spoke appear to be either completely powerless, lack the
capacity or are just unwilling to disturb the status quo. The reasons for this could be
numerous. However, at this point in time, it could be considered that it might not be
in the interest of those currently in physical, financial and political control of the
diamond zones to make any changes that might be deemed disadvantageous to their
own positions and interests.
105. In August 2012, the Group dispatched official letters to the Ministers of the
Interior, Defence, Finance, and Mines, Oil and Energy, requesting information
regarding any recent investigations or inquiries carried out by any State authority
into how the illicit diamond mining, buying, selling and exporting networks operate.
To date, no replies have been received from any of the aforementioned ministries.
Considering the high profile and nature of the issue, together with the continuing
loss of revenue, this silence is yet another example of the lack of political will of the
Government of Côte d’Ivoire to take control of its diamond resources.
106. In contrast, a number of players in the global diamond industry have expressed
an interest in the future of the Ivorian diamond industry following the full
implementation of the Kimberley Process and the lifting of the embargo. The
country remains a highly interesting prospect for exploration companies, but it is
highly unlikely that such companies would venture to invest capital on operations
until the Kimberley Process system is fully functioning, the embargo is lifted and
the security situation in the country is stabilized. One of the challenges of raising
capital with foreign creditors is their reluctance or refusal to invest while the
embargo is in place.
C. Diamond footprinting/fingerprinting
107. On 10 July 2012, the Group sent a request to the Government of Israel with
regard to a diamond exported from Mali to Israel that might be of Ivorian origin.
The stone was confiscated by and remains in the custody of the Israeli customs
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agency following a ruling by the Israeli Supreme Court. The Group has requested
that the stone remain in Israeli custody until the scientific research programme on
diamond fingerprinting has commenced, as this stone could play a significant role in
such work.
108. In February 2012, the Group visited Bamako and met with a number of
Government authorities, notably the Department of Foreign Affairs and Customs,
regarding the parcel of Côte d’Ivoire diamonds confiscated and held by the customs
authorities since December 2007 at Bamako airport. The Group has not had any
contact with the Malian authorities since the beginning of the political upheaval in
that country in March 2012. However, as the authorities in Bamako continue to
build State authority, the Group intends to re-engage with the Ministry of Foreign
Affairs and Customs, with a view to reviving discussions on the release of the
diamond parcel to Kimberley Process authorities for use in scientific studies on
diamond fingerprinting of Côte d’Ivoire production.
D. Kimberley Process
109. The Group has observed extremely limited progress with regard to the
implementation of the Kimberley Process in Côte d’Ivoire. The Ministry of Mines
has appointed Fatimata Thes as the Kimberley Process Focal Point. However, it
remains unclear what level of funding and staff capacity has been allocated by the
Minister to support Ms. Thes, and to resolve all the outstanding issues related to the
development and the creation of the minimum requirements of the Kimberley
Process. It is also presumed that the Ministry of Mines will be the “designated
authority” responsible for Kimberley Process implementation in Côte d’Ivoire;
however, this has not yet been clarified.
110. On 23 August 2012, the Ministry of Mines released the list of participants with
regard to the interministerial Kimberley Process Management Committee.
Fatimata Thes Ministry of Mines — Kimberley Process Focal Point
Adrimane Diabate Ministry of Mines
Ibrahim Coulibally Ministry of Mines
Yahiya Dembele Société pour le Développement Minier de la Côte
d’Ivoire (SODEMI)
Fatimata Toure Ministry of Foreign Affairs
Captain Brahima Bamba Ministry of Finance — Customs
Agnes Kone M’Lanhoro Ministry of Finance — Cellule nationale de traitement
des informations financiènes de Côte d’Ivoire
(CENTIF-CI)
111. The Group welcomed the appointment of the interministerial committee and its
members. While it is presumed that Ms. Thes will chair the committee, no other
documentation has been received regarding how the committee will operate or the
individual responsibilities of its members. The Group is also deeply disappointed to
observe that a representative of civil society has not yet been invited to join the
committee.
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112. The Group has also not yet seen any evidence of a planned and executable
import/export process to comply with the minimum requirements of the Kimberley
Process with respect to the export and the import of rough diamonds, the processing
of diamond shipments and the issuance of Kimberley Process certificates, or with
any laws that demand that exporters must provide a declaration that the stones are
conflict-free. A comprehensive set of operating procedures will need to be written
by the Ministry of Mines to ensure that procedures and checks are consistently and
correctly applied. A flow chart explaining such procedures would also be helpful.
113. A Kimberley Process technical assessment and assistance team visit is due to
take place from 25 to 29 September 2012. The mission will not be a formal
Kimberley Process review visit. The assessment work will take place under the
auspices of the Kimberley Process and in close cooperation with the Ministry of
Mines, Oil and Energy and members of the ad hoc Kimberley Process group Friends
of Côte d’Ivoire. The aim of this work is to document the dynamics of the internal
diamond trade from the point of production to the point of export. The primary goal
of the mission is to determine what steps Côte d’Ivoire needs to take to establish a
Kimberley Process Certification scheme. The visit will also be in conjunction with a
team of the United States Agency for International Development Land Tenure
Division, under the Property Rights and Resource Governance Programme, focusing
on the context of land tenure rights regarding artisanal diamond mining. This visit is
extremely significant, as it will mark the first visit to Côte d’Ivoire of any
Kimberley Process team since 2008.
E. Friends of Côte d’Ivoire6
114. The Group participated in a Friends of Côte d’Ivoire field trip to Séguéla from
28 to 29 August 2012. UNOCI provided outstanding and comprehensive logistical,
technical and security support for the duration of the visit. The Friends of Côte
d’Ivoire team consisted of the following participants:
Peter Huyghebaert Embassy of Belgium — Abidjan
Alfredo Camargo Embassy of Brazil — Abidjan
Chantal de Varennes Embassy of Canada — Abidjan
Bruno Pozzi European Union Representative Office — Abidjan
Gigja Sorensen European Union Representative Office — Abidjan
Hermann Didier Kouakou,
Secretary General
Groupe de recherché et de plaidoyer sur les industries
extractives (GRPIE) (civil society group)
Fatimata Thes Ministry of Mines, Oil and Energy, Kimberley
Process Focal Point
Calvin Tshidavhu Embassy of South Africa — Abidjan
Simon Tonge Embassy of the United Kingdom and Great Britain —
Abidjan
__________________
6 Friends of Côte d’Ivoire is an ad hoc committee of the Kimberley Process Working Group on
Monitoring that operates on an open forum basis. Any Kimberley Process member nation,
observer or interested party may request to participate in the Friends of Côte d’Ivoire
Committee.
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Simon Gilbert United Nations Group of Experts on Côte d’Ivoire
Phillip Carter III Embassy of United States of America — Abidjan
115. The members of Friends of Côte d’Ivoire took the opportunity to discuss the
embargo and the Kimberley Process with a range of senior local government
officials in Séguéla, including the Prefect, the Sub-Prefect, the Mayor, the Director
General of Mines, the Regional Director of Customs, Police, Gendarmerie and
FRCI. While these individuals are fully aware of the embargo and why it is in place,
it was abundantly clear that the requirements of the Kimberley Process were
unknown to them. There were constant, consistent, well-mannered and wellintended
requests to the members of Friends of Côte d’Ivoire to ensure the
immediate lifting of the embargo. While this demand was well noted by Friends of
Côte d’Ivoire, they explained on numerous occasions that one of the requirements
for lifting the embargo was to establish and implement the Kimberley Process
mechanism, and that this responsibility lay directly with the Government and the
Ministry of Mines representatives.
116. Friends of Côte d’Ivoire observed the diamond mining areas from a UNOCI
helicopter aerial reconnaissance flight. That was followed by a ground visit to
SODEMI (government parastatal) diamond concession areas containing the
Diarabana and Bobi kimberlitic dykes and an alluvial diamond digging and washing
area, where Friends of Côte d’Ivoire openly discussed how the artisanal diamond
mining industry operates with the community of workers.
117. Friends of Côte d’Ivoire also took the opportunity to meet with large
delegations from mining villages that included village chiefs and elders. The rather
formal discussion with these groups followed a pattern very similar to those with
local government officials. While the Ministry of Mines has informed the Group
that it has embarked on a thorough and widespread sensitization effort, it appears to
have not yet reached those Ivorians who are most impacted and affected by the
challenges of the Kimberley Process implementation.
118. During the visit of Friends of Côte d’Ivoire, the Group was given limited
access to the map of the SODEMI concessions that includes the aeromagnetic
survey information carried out in 1998 by Carnegie Diamonds. The Group intends to
make a formal request for a copy of this important document to aid the identification
of areas that might become a focus for future artisanal activity and for reference
purposes.
119. SODEMI officials who accompanied the Group on the field trip stated that
they had not been involved in the management of the concession since leaving the
site in 2002.
120. Local government authorities who also accompanied Friends of Côte d’Ivoire
to the concessions categorically and publically stated that they had no knowledge of
what had taken place within the area between 2002 and 2012 with regard to the
organization and the control of artisanal diamond mining, buying, selling and
exporting, as the area was reportedly controlled by “others”.
121. It was also evident from the Friends of Côte d’Ivoire field trip that artisanal
diamond mining communities are oblivious to the Kimberley Process and its
requirements. Other members of the diamond industry in Côte d’Ivoire, such as
buyers and sellers, are also in this category.
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F. Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative
122. The Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Board accepted Côte d’Ivoire
as an Extractive Industries Transparency Initiative Candidate country on 12 May
2008. At its meeting on 25 October 2011, the International Board concluded that
Côte d’Ivoire had made meaningful progress in implementing the Initiative. While
the first report of the Initiative was issued in March 2010, it covered only the oil and
gas sector. However, considering the potential doubling of gold exports over the next
18 months (from 7 to 13 tons), a more comprehensive report on the mining sector is
expected for the second Initiative report. Despite the continuation of the embargo,
the Group will encourage the Initiative to include a review of the diamond sector in
the report. Côte d’Ivoire’s candidacy was renewed for 18 months (until 25 April
2013), by the end of which it must have completed a validation that demonstrates
compliance with the 2011 edition of the Initiative rules.
IX. Individual sanctions
A. Individuals sanctioned
123. The Group continued its investigations concerning possible violations of the
targeted sanctions on individuals in accordance with the measures imposed in
paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004), as renewed in paragraph 1 and
amended in paragraph 4 of resolution 1643 (2005). These individuals are Charles Blé
Goudé, Eugène N’goran Djué and Martin Kouakou Fofié. Additionally, in accordance
with paragraph 12 of resolution 1975 (2011), targeted sanctions were imposed on
Laurent Gbagbo, Simone Gbagbo, Désiré Tagro, Pascal Affi N’Guessan and Alcide
Djédjé.
124. In a letter dated 30 July 2012 addressed to the Ministry of Justice of Côte
d’Ivoire, the Group requested an update concerning the legal status of the
sanctioned individuals. That letter remains unanswered.
125. The Group also requested all financial information related to the sanctioned
individuals from the Ivorian Central Bank (Banque centrale des états de l’Afrique de
l’Ouest), the Chamber of Commerce and the Directorate of Taxes and Revenues.
Despite this renewed request, the information has not yet been provided to the
Group.
Charles Blé Goudé
126. The Group is highly concerned about the information gathered related to the
financial intermediary efforts made by Blé Goudé in financing the strategy referred
to in the arms and finance sections of this report. The Group will continue to
investigate the case, and expects to further shed light on this.
127. Also, after receiving information about possible travel by Blé Goudé to South
Africa, the Group addressed a letter to the Government of South Africa requesting
its cooperation in following up the case, especially because of the travel ban
imposed on him. Similar requests were sent to the Governments of Angola, Benin,
Ghana, Togo and Zimbabwe. The Group still awaits replies from these Governments
on this specific issue.
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128. The Group obtained a copy of a passport issued by the Republic of Mali that
allegedly belongs to Mr. Goudé, but under a different name. The Group is currently
investigating the matter and expects further reply to its queries from the
Government of Mali.
129. The Group renewed its request to the French independent publisher, Éditions
et Librairies L’Harmattan, in order to obtain information about the contract and
financial obligations with Mr. Blé Goudé and the terms of royalties payment for the
publication of his latest book. However, at the time of writing of the present report,
the Group had not received any reply, despite its letters sent to L’Harmattan in
December 2011 and February 2012. The Group considers this a flagrant violation of
the measures imposed by the Security Council, in particular the assets freeze. The
Group also understands that L’Harmattan also has not replied to a letter sent in May
2012 from the Chairman of the Committee in this regard.
Martin Kouakou Fofié
130. The Group continues to be concerned about the fact that the Government of
Côte d’Ivoire appointed Mr. Fofié as Chef de la Compagnie Territoriale of Korhogo.
The Group believes that this position within the Government of Côte d’Ivoire
facilitates Mr. Fofié’s ability to violate the measures imposed on him by the
Committee, in particular the assets freeze.
Eugène N’goran Djué
131. The Group awaits a response from the Ministry of Justice of Côte d’Ivoire, as
well as from all Ivorian finance-related entities, concerning updated information
regarding the legal status of Mr. Djué before Ivorian justice and his assets.
Laurent Gbagbo
132. The Group obtained credible information and evidence regarding a bank
account opened in France where funds are reportedly being collected in support of
former President Gbagbo. The Group is currently investigating the case and has
contacted the bank institution where the account has been opened for this purpose.
133. The Group is also investigating a possible diversion of funds from PETROCI,
the Ivorian oil company, to support Mr. Gbagbo through a front company supplying
stationery.
Simone Gbagbo
134. The Group awaits a response from the Ivorian Ministry of Justice, as well as
from all Ivorian finance-related entities, concerning updated information on
Mrs. Gbagbo’s legal status before Ivorian justice and her assets.
Alcide Djédjé
135. The Group awaits a response from the Ivorian Ministry of Justice, as well as
responses from all Ivorian finance-related entities, concerning updated information
concerning Mr. Djédjé’s legal status before the Ivorian justice and his assets.
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Pascal Affi N’Guessan
136. The Group awaits a response from the Ivorian Ministry of Justice, as well as
responses from all Ivorian finance-related entities, concerning updated information
concerning Mr. N’Guessan’s legal status before Ivorian justice and his assets.
B. Proposed individuals and entities to consider for
targeted sanctions
137. By paragraph 17 of its resolution 2045 (2012), the Security Council underlined
that the report of the Group of Experts may include, as appropriate, any information
and recommendations relevant to the Committee’s possible additional designation of
the individuals and entities described in paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004)
and paragraph 10 of resolution 1980 (2011).
138. By paragraph 15 of its resolution 1980 (2011), the Security Council decided
that the report of the Group of Experts, as referred to in paragraph 7 (e) of
resolution 1727 (2006), may include, as appropriate, any information and
recommendations relevant to the Committee’s possible additional designation of the
individuals and entities described in paragraphs 9 and 11 of resolution 1572 (2004);
that is, those subject to possible travel and financial sanctions.
139. The Group continues to be of the view that the list of individuals and entities
proposed for sanctions in paragraph 239 of its April 2012 final report (S/2012/196)
remains valid.
X. Recommendations
140. The Group is of the view that the recommendations contained in its final report
(S/2012/196, paras. 212-234) remain valid, especially with regard to the Group’s
recommendations for targeted sanctions against Robert Montoya and Frédéric
Lafont.
A. Arms
141. The Group invites the sanctions Committee to provide more detailed
specification regarding land, air and sea vehicles to be subject to notification or
exemption.
142. The Group invites the Ivorian authorities, in coordination with international
partners, to develop a radio early warning system in areas on the border with Liberia
that are not covered by the mobile network.
B. Finance
143. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d’Ivoire take all
necessary measures to curb the large-scale contraband of cocoa and cashew nuts and
all commodities through its borders, particularly with Ghana. It is important to
reinforce the capacity of all border control authorities, including customs, police,
gendarmerie and water and forests. The Group also recommends commencing
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investigations against local authorities that may be facilitating the contraband, with
a view to avoiding the diversion of unaccounted funds that may be used in violation
of the sanctions regime.
144. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d’Ivoire continue to
increase transparency in the management of the country’s oil revenues, take
measures against the increasing problem of the illegal artisanal gold mining and
illegal timber exploitation, and commence investigations against possible corruption
cases within the agency in charge of managing timber exploitation.
145. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d’Ivoire facilitate the
Group’s investigations by replying in a timely manner to its embargo-financerelated
queries, granting access to all necessary finance documents, and ensuring
that Ivorian-registered companies do likewise.
146. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d’Ivoire take all
measures to continue to redeploy all fiscal control agencies throughout the country
and combat all types of illegal taxation and increase the level of internal security to
avoid acts of racketeering, robbery and pillaging by illegal armed groups.
147. The Group recommends that the Government immediately undertake a
thorough investigation of all financial actions related to La Centrale, and
recommends that the Group have immediate and unrestricted access to all financial
records regarding the activities of La Centrale.
C. Customs and transport
148. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d’Ivoire accelerate the
process of redeploying customs officers all over the country and provide them with
proper training and equipment to perform their duties, especially those related to the
enforcement of the sanctions regime.
149. The Group recommends that all Member States, in particular Côte d’Ivoire and
its neighbours, take all necessary legislative measures in order to allow all customs
users and stakeholders (suppliers, shippers, pre-shipment inspection companies,
customs brokers, clearing agents, forwarding agents, loaders, insurers, etc.) to
enforce the measures imposed on Côte d’Ivoire by the Security Council.
150. The Group recommends that all Member States implement and insert into their
national customs legislation all the measures imposed by the Security Council, make
these regulations available to the public and raise awareness on such regulations
among the concerned parties.
151. The Group recommends that the eight UNOCI customs experts conduct
customs-related activities in order to enhance the capacity of the Ivorian customs to
enforce the sanctions regime imposed by the Security Council on Côte d’Ivoire.
D. Diamonds
152. The Group of Experts recommends that, considering the current demonstrable
lack of political will and/or the lack of capacity within the Ministry of Mines to
resolve the issue of Kimberley Process implementation and to bring the diamond
industry in Côte d’Ivoire back under Government control, both the Kimberley
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Process Implementation Committee and the Kimberley Process Focal Point should
come under the jurisdiction and the chairmanship of a newly created presidential
task force on diamonds to ensure that the issue is dealt with in a timely and
appropriate manner, and further, that, following the implementation of the
Kimberley Process, the minimum standards are maintained.
153. The Group of Experts recommends that, considering the economic importance
attached to artisanal diamond mining by senior local government officials, village
chiefs and elders, democratically elected representatives of these districts should be
lobbied and the issue brought to the attention of and debated at the National
Assembly of Côte d’Ivoire.
154. The Group of Experts recommends that the Ministry of Mines review the
membership of the Kimberley Process Management Committee and officially invite
and include a representative of civil society.
155. The Group of Experts recommends that the Government of Côte d’Ivoire
continue to take a proactive approach in engaging all of its neighbours, with a view
to facilitating the exchange of knowledge and experience on diamond-related
matters, in order to develop capacity, capability and channels of communication. A
comprehensive Kimberley Process workshop should be convened in Abidjan to
maintain this valuable information resource.
156. The Group of Experts recommends that the Kimberley Process Management
Committee of the Ministry of Mines, Oil and Energy begin, in consultation with all
stakeholders, to create detailed written plans on the implementation of the
Kimberley Process, including detailed process and procedure documents as
discussed in this report.
157. The Group of Experts recommends that during 2013, the Kimberley Process
Chair must openly guarantee to continue to provide as much support to the
Government of Côte d’Ivoire as is possible, including and where necessary, on-theground
technical assistance during Kimberley Process planning and implementation
phases.
E. Individual sanctions
158. The Group recommends that all financial-related institutions in Côte d’Ivoire,
including the tax and cadastral agency, the Chamber of Commerce and the Central
Bank, grant immediate and unrestricted access to all financial records pertaining to
the individual under targeted sanctions.
159. The Group recommends that the publishing house Éditions et Librairies
L’Harmattan reply to its various queries about payments of royalties made to Blé
Goudé.
160. The Group recommends that the Government of Côte d´Ivoire undertake a
financial investigation of all assets and financial-related information pertaining to
Martin Kouakou Fofié.
161. The Group recommends that the Governments of Belgium and France
undertake an investigation concerning the organization created to collect funds in
support of Laurent Gbagbo. The organization was created in Belgium and has
opened a bank account in France to collect funds for Mr. Gbagbo.
To be continued
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